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The impact of EU membership on the UK constitution has been profound. In the 
Miller (Article 50) case, the Supreme Court described the effect of the European 
Communities Act 1972 (ECA) ± the means by which EU membership was given 
effect within the UK ± as being unprecedented in constitutional terms. Not only did it 
provide for a new source of law, and a new constitutional process for making law in 
WKH8.LWDOVRIXQGDPHQWDOO\FKDQJHGWKH8.¶VV\VWHPRIJRYHUQPHQWDQGWKHZD\
in which we think about the location and exercise of public power. 
 
The key constitutional change was the shift from what was understood in 1972 (at 
least outside Northern Ireland) as a unitary constitutional order, with a single 
legislative body and single source of sovereign authority (the UK parliament) to a 
multi-level system in which governmental power is divided and shared between 
different geographical tiers. Not only did EU law act as a constraint upon the 
legislative competence of the UK parliament ± and later also upon the devolved 
legislatures in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland ± but the EU was itself a limited 
legal order, bound by its own constitutional framework as laid down in the treaties. 
 
EU membership has therefore been a significant driver of the movement away from 
WKH 8.¶V WUDGLWLRQDOO\ SROLWLFDO FRQVWLWXWLRQ LQ ZKLFK GHPRFUDWLF DFFRXQWDELOLW\ ZDV
regarded as the major guarantee against abuse of governmental power, towards a 
more legally-constrained constitution, with a greater role for the courts as a check on 
public bodies. Its impact has been both direct and indirect. In direct terms, EU law 
itself has proved to be a fertile source of grounds of challenge to government action. 
Individuals and organisations who think that their rights under EU law have been 
breached by public bodies have been able to bring actions before the UK courts, 
often securing better remedies than would have been available under purely 
domestic law. Indirectly, the broader shifts in constitutional thinking engendered by 
EU membership ± about the dividing and sharing of governmental power, and about 
the role of law in constraining the state ± may have paved the way for later 
developments, such as devolution and the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), which 
have also enhanced the constitutional role of the courts. 
 
The most obvious constitutional impact of EU membership has been on the doctrine 
of parliamentary sovereignty. In the famous case of R v Secretary of State for 
Transport ex p Factortame (No 2) [1991] 1 AC 603, the House of Lords, for the first 
time since the Glorious Revolution, µGLVDSSOLHG¶DQ$FWRIWKH8.Sarliament so as to 
give priority to a directly effective principle of EU law. Constitutional scholars 
continue to argue about the basis for the Factortame decision, and the extent to 
which it modified the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. But there is no doubt that 
the ECA achieved what the orthodox (Diceyan) version of sovereignty said was 
impossible: the parliament of 1972 succeeded in binding its successor parliaments to 
give primacy to EU law (at least while the ECA remains on the statute book). 
 
Moreover, the modification of the sovereignty rule has not been limited to compliance 
with EU law. 6LU-RKQ/DZV¶UDWLRQDOLVDWLRQRIWKHFactortame decision in Thoburn v 
Sunderland CC [2003] QB 151 introduced the idea that the domestic legal order 
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recognises a hierarchy of statutes. Whereas Dicey had famously claimed that the 
Acts of Union of 1706-1707 were of no greater legal authority than the Dentists Act 
LW LVQRZDFFHSWHGWKDWµFRQVWLWXWLRQDOVWDWXWHV¶VXFKDVWKH(&$EXWDlso the 
HRA, the devolution statutes, the Representation of the People Acts and so on, 
enjoy a special legal status which immunises them from implied repeal.8 
 
However, the constitutional effects of EU membership are by no means limited to 
parliamentary sovereignty. /RUG'HQQLQJ¶VIDPRXVPHWDSKRURI(8ODZEHLQJµOLNHDQ
LQFRPLQJ WLGH ,W IORZV LQWR WKH HVWXDULHV DQG XS WKH ULYHUV¶9 applies as much in 
relation to constitutional law as in other areas. General principles of EU law, such as 
proportionality, certainty, transparency and respect for fundamental rights, have 
influenced the way in which UK domestic courts approach the task of controlling 
public power, and have altered specific legal doctrines, such as eroding the 
privileges of the Crown in litigation10 or imposing state liability for unlawful acts.11 
 
As well as shifting the balance of power between the courts and parliament, EU 
membership has also affected the separation of powers between the executive and 
the legislature. In general, its effect has been to empower government ministers, 
who have an important law-making role in the EU via the Council of Ministers and 
extensive powers to implement European obligations via secondary legislation, at 
the expense of parliament. In addition, EU membership has been a conduit for the 
influence of constitutional ideas from our European neighbours ± for instance, the 
requirement to use a system of proportional representation for European Parliament 
elections or the use of constitutional referendums as a means of checking further 
European integration.12 
 
The overarching legal framework provided by EU law has also fulfilled certain 
constitutional functions which are less easily performed within the domestic legal 
order. In relation to devolution, for instance, EU law has acted as a centralising 
influence, counteracting the potentially disintegrative forces unleashed by the 
creation of sub-state legislatures. More specifically, in Northern Ireland, the UK and 
WKH ,ULVK 5HSXEOLF¶V FRPPRQ PHPEHUVKLS RI WKH (8 ZDV RQH RI WKH IDFWRUV WKDW
facilitated the Good Friday Agreement, which ended 30 years of conflict by enabling 
the sharing of sovereignty across the Irish border without threatening Northern 
,UHODQG¶V SODFH ZLWKLQ WKH 8. EU membership has also entrenched certain 
commitments, for instance to environmental protection, or gender equality, or the 
maintenance of open markets, which cannot be guaranteed in domestic law because 
of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. 
 
EU membership has thus had both deep and pervasive effects on the UK 
constitution, and leaving the EU will therefore amount to another fundamental 
constitutional change. Moreover, whereas the decision to join the EU was primarily 
motivated by economic considerations, the impetus for Brexit has been primarily 
constitutional ± WKHGHVLUHWRµWDNHEDFNFRQWURO¶E\UHVWRULQJVRYHUHLJQW\WRGRPHVWLF
institutions and breaking free of a set of supranational institutions that, as Theresa 
                                            
8
 See also H v Lord Advocate [2012] UKSC 24; 2012 SC (UKSC) 308; R (HS2 Action 
Alliance Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport [2014] UKSC 3 
9
 HP Bulmer Ltd v J Bollinger SA [1974] Ch 401 at 418 
10
 R v Secretary of State for Transport ex p Factortame (No 2) [1991] 1 AC 603; Miller & 
Bryce v Keeper of the Registers of Scotland 1997 SLT 1000 
11
 Francovich v Italy [1991] ECR I-5357, [1993] 2 CMLR 66 
12
 See Referendum Act 1975; European Union Act 2011, Pt 1; European Union Referendum 
Act 2015 
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May put it in her Lancaster House speech in January 2 µVLW YHU\ XQHDVLO\ LQ
relation to our politLFDOKLVWRU\DQGZD\RIOLIH¶The European Union (Withdrawal) Bill 
will therefore repeal the ECA and related provisions in the devolution statutes, 
thereby ending WKH8.¶V domestic obligations to implement and comply with EU law, 
DQGZLOOµUHSDWULDWH¶GHFLVLRQ-making competences currently exercised at EU level to 
the UK and (perhaps) devolved parliaments. 
 
However, it would be a mistake to think that we can turn the constitutional clock back 
to 31 December 1972. The idea of constrained and divided constitutional power, 
which was such a novelty when the UK joined the EU, has since become the 
constitutional norm. For instance, the existence of devolved legislatures significantly 
complicates the process of withdrawing from the EU. Difficult issues as to the 
implications of Brexit for the future division of competences between the UK and 
devolved levels ± and in relation to both Scotland and Northern Ireland (both of 
which voted to remain in the EU) ± have reopened questions about the survival of 
the UK state. It also seems unlikely that the constitutional role of the courts will 
shrink back to what it was prior to joining the EU. One lasting legacy of EU 
membership is likely to be a permanently emboldened UK judiciary still willing to use 
at least some of the legal tools bequeathed to it by EU law to constrain the exercise 
of public power. 
 
EU membership will also leave a lasting imprint on the UK constitutional order in the 
IRUPRIDQHZFDWHJRU\RI µUHWDLQHG(8ODZ¶ WREHFUHDWHGE\ WKH domestication of 
currently directly effective or directly applicable EU laws via the EU (Withdrawal) Bill. 
These will continue to have a superior status to other domestic laws, as well as 
continue to bind the devolved legislatures, and could persist for years, if not 
decades, until they are finally replaced by domestic legislation. The precise 
implications of this new legal category are complex and unclear, and are likely to 
create problems for lawyers, judges and government actors for a long time to come. 
 
In other respects, however, the constitutional change brought about by Brexit may be 
greater. New or enlarged institutions may need to be created to carry out the 
governmental tasks currently performed at EU level, such as emissions trading or 
trade negotiations, and new capacities developed for scrutinising legislation and 
policy in these areas. Removing the obligation to comply with EU law may also 
create opportunities for greater policy and institutional experimentation than might 
otherwise have been possible ± for instance a return to a significant role for public 
ownership or a reversal of the trend towards the creation of independent regulatory 
agencies. 
 
On the other hand, international legal constraints (particularly international trade laws 
and any future UK-EU trade deal) are likely to take on a greater significance as a 
constraint on government action, and may require a constitutional response. Of 
immediate concern are the extensive proposed µ+HQU\ 9,,, SRZHUV¶ FRQIHUUHG RQ
ministers by the EU Withdrawal Bill to implement the EU withdrawal agreement and 
secure compliance with international obligations, which will allow them to make 
extensive changes to domestic law, subject to only limited parliamentary scrutiny. 
 
In short, Brexit notwithstanding, lawyers will continue to have to grapple with the 
LPSDFWRI(8PHPEHUVKLSRQWKH8.¶VFRQVWLWXWLRQDVZHOODVZLWKWKHUHDOLWy, in an 
increasingly globalised world, of the need to share governmental power within and 
beyond the boundaries of the state. 
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